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Debt Overhang, Liquidity Constraints, and Adjustment Incentives
1. Introduction
Investment in most heavily indebted countries has been weak
since 1982. Several papers (Krugman, 1988; Corden, 1988; Sachs,
1989) have subsequently established the debt overhang proposition:
the existence of a heavy debt burden reduces the incentive to
invest.
1 This proposition has given an important rationale for the
1989 shift in international debt management, emphasizing debt
relief rather than new money for problem debtors. This paper will
raise doubts against the debt overhang proposition: Its analytical
implications are found to be ambiguous, its empirical content is
found to be weak. We conclude, that investment in the average
debtor country is likely to benefit more from new lending than from
debt reduction.That liquidity constraints, not the debt overhang, are
probably decisive for the low levels of investment in the problem
debtors, may be suggested by Table 1. Since 1982, investment in
Latin America has fallen on average by 6.8 per cent of GDP compared
with the 1970s, almost exactly equal to the increase in the
non-interest external surplus (which roughly measures the reduction
in liquidity). In the meantime, foreign debt has grown only
slowly. While investment ratios in Latin America dropped
immediately in 1983 to accommodate the switch in net financial
transfers (net new debt minus interest), they have stabilized
thereafter on a modest upward trend (IDB, 1989, table II-4).
Table 1 shows also, contrary to what is often maintained, that
investment ratios in Latin America are not low by historical
standards. Investment ratios and the non-rinterest current account
look now as they looked in the 1960s. Given this prima facie
evidence, it would be surprising if investment had been more
affected by the debt overhang channel than by the liquidity




Investment 18.6 23.2 16.4
Non-Interest
External Surplus 5.3 -0.4 6.1
Change 1983-88 against period
Investment -1.8 -6.8 -
External Surplus 0.8 6.5
Source: IDB, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America,
1989 Report.
Nevertheless, some preliminary analysis by the IMF (1989) has
concluded that the debt overhang plays a large part in explaining
the slump in investment in problem debtor countries. The IMF bases
its support of the debt overhang proposition on two pieces of
evidence. First, the savings ratio in the so-called Baker-15
countries ' has fallen, rather than increased, when external finance
dried up. The necessary squeeze in domestic demand relative to
output was therefore more than fully reflected in lower investment.
Second, a comparison of the country group of problem debtors with
a group of other heavily-indebted countries which did not
experience debt-servicing problems shows that investment and
savings ratios dropped in the former group but not in the latter.
This evidence supposedly confirms the debt overhang hypothesis
which attributes disincentive effects to the fact that debt servicebecomes linked to economic performance in problem debtors, thus
weakening the incentive to invest.
A closer inspection of the IMF analysis reveals several
shortcomings, however.
—First, the base period 1975-81, against which the IMF compares
events after 1981, is highly exceptional because it includes the
years when the build-up of foreign debt was overshooting at an
unsustainable pace. Especially during 1978-81, foreign savings
financed exceptional levels of investment in problem debtor
countries. A standard investment model easily explains why
investment ratios peaked in that period and dropped thereafter
(Dornbusch, 1985). The increasing anticipation of future
depreciation of the real exchange rate acts as a temporary
investment stimulus in developing countries, since imports form an
important part of inputs in the production of investment. While
anticipated depreciation means an immediate jump in the real price
of assets, real capital costs start only to rise once real
depreciation sets in. Then disinvestment takes place.
—Second, the IMF analysis selects a control group of
middle-income non-problem debtors which is highly arbitrary.
Non-problem debtors are defined as indebted countries that have not
confronted serious debt-servicing difficulties. The IMF sample
picks only high-investment countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,Thailand and Turkey). We have added Algeria, Greece, Israel, and
Portugal which also belong to the group of non-problem debtors to
extend the control group
3' for a covariance test.
The covariance test is presented in Table 2 for savings ratios,
in Table 3 for investment ratios. The test reveals that the change
in savings ratios (comparing the periods 1982-87 and 1971-81) was
not significant at a 95 per cent confidence level, regardless if
the IMF sample or the extended sample was chosen as a control
group. There has indeed been an important drop in savings ratios
and investment ratios in problem debtor countries during the 1980s.
But the variance of national savings ratios within the country
groups was too big and the variance between country groups too
small to confirm the debt overhang proposition along these lines.
The only difference which is significant at a 95 per cent
confidence level is found for the changes in investment ratios
between problem debtors and the IMF sample of non-problem debtors.
The fact that investment behavior changed more markedly than the
savings behavior between problem and non-problem debtors, points
again to the evidence that investment was governed by net financial
flows more than by debt stock related disincentives.
[TABLE 2]
[TABLE 3]Hence, more rigorous empirical evidence is needed about the
debt-related channels that have impacted on investment in
developing debtor countries. This is the principal aim of this
paper. The remainder of it is structured as follows: Section 2
will put the debt overhang proposition into perspective, by
contrasting it with the standard theories of consumption and
investment behavior under a credit constraint, and integrates both
views in empirical specifications of investment and consumption
functions. The results of the econometric test are presented in
section 3. Section 4 concludes that debt reduction will not
produce higher savings and investment compared to alternative debt
strategies (such as forced lending) unless it maximizes the cash
flow relief for indebted countries.
2. Foreign Debt, Consumption, and Investment
2.1: The Debt Overhang proposition
The "debt overhang" proposition belongs to the group of moral
hazard interpretations of the current debt crisis. Their advocates
(Sachs, 1989; Krugman, 1988; Corden, 1988) argue that a "debt
overhang" provides a disincentive for adjustment. Both concepts
have been put into a specific context. "Adjustment" (which can be
thought of as economic reform) refers to the debtor's decision to
invest or to consume in a two-period model. The economy "inherits"
a given stock of debt in the first period which must be serviced
in the second period. The decision in period one is to consume orto invest, the latter yielding a return in period two, which serves
to pay back the debt and to consume. This decision is presumed to
be biased towards consumption in the presence of a "debt overhang".
This is defined as the difference between the face value of debt
outstanding and its market value — the expected present value of
future resource transfers (debt service minus new debt) from the
borrower to the lender. The "debt overhang" may act like a tax on
the debtor's consumption in period two. This is because for
over-indebted countries, debt service does not depend on scheduled
interest and amortization anymore, but is linked to their economic
performance via arrears and involuntary lending. If a debtor is
only servicing part of his debt, reduced consumption in period one
is not offset by higher consumption in the future, because the
creditor would reap all or most of the benefits of that adjustment
effort. Consequently, it does not pay to invest, and the country
will consume its resources in period one, and will default upon its
debt. Hence the conclusion, that debt relief would increase the
incentive of a debtor country to make an adjustment effort (to
invest), because it would leave a larger share of the benefits from
investment to the debtor. Debt relief would be in the interest of
both debtor and creditor, since now at least part of the debt is
repaid.
Following Corden's (1988) interpretation, debt overhang can be
illustrated as in figure l
4^.
[Insert Figure 1]In figure 1, the horizontal axis measures -predetermined- output
net of debt obligations in period 1, A. Consumption in period 1
is measured from the origin to the right, and period 1 investment
is measured leftwards, starting from A. Investment yields output
in period 2 along AB. Without inherited debt, AB is the consumption
possibility curve, and the country would choose SI, the point of
tangency of this curve with the utility function Ul; it will invest
AJ1, and consume 0J1. A small inherited debt Dl shifts consumption
possibilities downwards to C0C0, and the optimum now yields higher
investment AJ2, and lower consumption. At low levels of debt,
therefore a positive association between debt and investments
should exist. However, if the inherited debt is very large, say D2,
point A would be optimal, implying the consumption of all resources
in period one, and default in period 2. The debt overhang position
A therefore predicts the association of high debt and low
investments, which the IMF finds in the data. If indeed point A
in figure 1 applies to the problem debtor countries, debt relief
would be rational for the creditors. Forgiving the amount R would
induce the country to choose S3, thus investing AJ3, and paying
back (D2-R).2.2 Debt and Liquidity Constraints
The positive effect of a small debt on investment, as described
by Corden apply in the case of a cut-off from the capital markets
from international capital markets, but equally, if the debtor is
credit constraint, as will be shown below. With free access to
capital markets, no pro-investment incentive effect of a small debt
exists, as is shown by Callier (1989)
5), and will be repeated here.
Then the case of a credit constrained debtor is analyzed, and
factors which explain investment and consumption behavior will be
identified. These will be used in the empirical section 3, for
testing the various hypothesis presented. Throughout, it is
assumed that the consumption and investment decisions are under
control of a social planner, thus substitution effects are
neglected.
6^
If a country has unrestricted access to the international
capital market, i.e., is only limited by its intertemporal budget
constraint, investment and consumption decisions are separated.
The country will invest until the marginal productivity of capital
is equal to the world interest rate (see appendix I, case I for a
formal exposition), and it will borrow up to the point where
marginal utility is equated in each period. The capital market is
used to allocate wealth over time and the country will consume
according to its wealth constraint (see, for example, Sachs 1984,
10p. 6 ff). The equilibrium of a debtor without a liquidity
constraint is depicted as point So in figure 2.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
In figure 2, consumption possibilities are not restricted to
C0C0, as in Corden's case, but can be extended along the capital
market line HH, with slope -1/(1 + r), where r is the world
interest rate. In the unconstrained case, r represents the
opportunity costs of borrowing. The borrower will invest until the
capital market line is tangent to the C0C0 schedule, i.e. AJ0. It
will subsequently borrow J0D in order to achieve the preferred
consumption point SQr where the utility function is tangent to HH.
An increase in inherited debt
7^ from Do to Dx would shift the C0C0
curve downwards to CJCJ, but would leave investment unaffected at
AJ0, since both marginal productivity of capital and the
opportunity costs of capital are unaffected. The loss in wealth
from Wo to Wj caused by the increase in debt burden is spread over
consumption in period 1 and 2, as can be seen in the new
consumption point Sl. Borrowing is reduced, and period 1
consumption as a percentage of — predetermined — output A falls.
However, if the utility function is homothetic,
consumption as a percentage of wealth remains constant.
11Corden's (1988) pro-incentive effect of an increase in debt
therefore does not apply if access to capital markets exists.
Investments are only determined by marginal productivity and world
market interest rates.
Unrestricted access to capital markets seems hardly a relevant
case for most LDC borrowers, and especially for the problem debtors
over the 1980s. The inability to borrow as much as desired, or
indeed the net lenders position enforced upon these countries,
affects the optimal investment-consumption choice, since these
entities are now inter-related.
[Insert figure 3]
Suppose a country can only borrow the amount Bc (see figure 3),
and suppose this constraint is binding. Investing AJ0 would imply
consuming in point S2, since only Bc can be borrowed. This is no
longer optimal: a higher utility level could be reached by reducing
investments, and increasing consumption. Due to the credit
constraint, the shadow price of capital now exceeds the world
discount rate (Sachs, 1984, p.20), yielding a steeper opportunity
costs of capital line, HCHC (see Appendix 1, case II). The
opportunity costs of capital are a function of borrowing
possibilities and marginal utility of consumption. The optimal
investment is now AJlf where HCHC, is tangent with the C0C0 curve .
Optimal consumption is determined by the amount which can be
12fur Weltwirtschaft Kiel
borrowed on the international capital market, Bc, which gives S3/
where C^A-Ajyt-B,. and C2=f (AJJ-D-fl+rJB
 9). Note that in the
consumption point the utility curve U3 is tangent to a line
parallel to the HCHC line, and thus the marginal rate of
substitution is still equal to the marginal rate of transformation.
The lower Be is, the more the opportunity costs of capital will
differ from the world interest rate, and the less will be invested,
and the less is consumed in period one, both absolute, and in terms
of output in period one. However, due to reduced investments, the
credit constraint reduces the country's wealth as well, and the
change in consumption as a percentage of the latter is ambiguous.
The credit constraint has several other implications as well
(formally derived in Appendix I, case II). The lower discounted
period 2 marginal utility is relative to period 1 marginal utility
—in other words, the lower the propensity to save— the lower
investments will be. Savings, being a source of capital, become
argument in the investment function.
An increase in inherited debt now again has a positive effect
on investment: since more old debt has to be repaid in period two,
the country is less willing to borrow in period one. This means,
however, that the the credit constraint becomes less binding, the
shadow price of capital falls, and investment and consumption in
period one are increased. Corden's (1988) case of isolation from
13the capital market, in which a small debt stimulates investments,
is nothing but a special case of a credit constraint borrower.
For a net borrower which is credit constraint, an increase in
the interest rate has equally a positive effect on investment. The
increase in the costs of borrowing reduces the propensity to do so,
and therefore relaxes the borrowing constraint, which reduces the
shadow price of capital, hence investments are increased. However,
most problem debtors have become net lenders over the 1980's, by
repaying old obligations, without receiving new loans. In that
case, a rise in interest rates makes it more profitable to repay,
but this tightens the credit constraint (less capital is available
for domestic purposes), and thus investments are reduced.
An interesting special case arises, when the credit limit is a
function of the inherited debt (see appendix I, case III). Now, the
positive direct effect of an increase in inherited debt, as
described above, are counteracted by the reduced borrowing
possibilities due to this increase, and the total effect might
result in reduced investments. Simple bivariate correlations could
therefore yield the rather misleading result that debt reduces
investments, whereas the crucial point would be the credit
constraint.
142.3 Empirical Specification
The conceptual discussion of the previous section has identified
a number of variables influencing consumption and investment in
debtor countries, the effects of which may vary with the credit
regime the country is subject to. This section will give the
empirical specification, and will identify the various hypotheses
to be tested.
2.3.1 The Investment Function
The effect of debt on investment is estimated in the context of
an investment equation, containing the variables discussed in the
previous two sections:
(2.1) I = a0 + c^r + o^S + a3(dF/dK) + a4NTR + a5D + u
where I = investment
r = real interest rate
S = savings
dF/dK = marginal productivity of capital
NTR = net transfer to the debtor country
D = debt burden
u = error term
15The expected signs of the coefficients differ with the various
hypotheses discussed and are summarized in Table 4.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
Table 4 presents the extreme form of the debt overhang, in which
all benefits of investments in excess of "minimum consumption" are
captured by creditors, and if one relaxes this assumption, o^ a3 and
a4 will be positive under the debt overhang hypothesis as well.
However, the two hypothesis predict opposite impact on consumption.
In order to estimate equation (2.1) a number of proxies for the
variables had to be taken of which the most important one is that
of debt burden. The debt burden, D, can be measured in a number
of ways. In the empirical research concerning the determinants of
repayment problems, usually a measure of debt/exports, debt/GDP or
debt service is used. Neither of these variables is a perfect
measure of real burden, and all of them are endogenous variables
to a certain extent: rational creditors would only allow a country
to build up a high debt or debt service level (compared to GDP or
exports) if they ascribe a high creditworthiness to this country,
or in other words, if the debt burden for the country is
manageable. Besides, the correct measure for debt burden depends
upon the nature of the problem: if the debt crisis is basically
16seen as an internal transfer problem, debt to GDP is more accurate
than debt to exports or debt service to exports, whereas the latter
is more accurate if the problem is the external transfer. Debt
service depends, to a large extent, on the maturity distribution
of the debt, and is rather a measure of liquidity than of debt
burden. As such, it is already included in the transfer variable
of equation (2.1). Differences in timing of repayments and levels
of interest for different countries would make the discounted
present value of future debt service a better indicator, but if
liquidity is constrained, not only present values count, but also
the timing of debt service. Finally, without any change in debt,
debt service, or any other conventional measure, the real burden
may increase, e.g. due to terms of trade movements, a rise in
interest rates, if the debt is floating rate debt, etc..
Given these qualifications, one can expect to find the
conventional measures to have only a weak relation with debt
burden. However, this relation may become stronger, if we add a.
priori information: given that a country has debt servicing
problems, an increase in the debt to GDP-ratio will more likely
indicate an increase in the debt burden than a reduction of it.
A more direct measure of debt problems is equally tested as a proxy
for debt burden: interest arrears. Again, this is not an
undisputed measure of debt burden, but it does track the debt
overhang proposition.
As a proxy for world market real interest rates, the US
17government bond yield deflated by the percentage change in the U.S.
GDP deflator was taken. Productivity of investments was proxied by
growth in GDP. For the savings variable, Domestic Savings as a
percentage of GDP were taken. Net transfers were calculated as net
long term capital disbursements minus long term interest payments.
Short term capital movements were excluded, due to lack of data
over the 1970s.
2.3.2 The Consumption Function
As discussed in the previous section, the unconstrained borrower
will divide its wealth over consumption now and in the future. Debt
and credit constraints have influence on the marginal propensity
to consume, as well as on wealth itself. In order to distinguish
empirically between these effects, we will test the hypotheses on
consumption in the context of the Permanent Income hypothesis. The
IDB (1989, p.116) reviews empirical evidence for the Permanent
Income Hypothesis in developing countries, and concludes that it
"provides a useful explanation" for consumption behavior.
Following this hypothesis, permanent consumption C_ is a function
of permanent income Y :
(2.2) Cp = k Yp
where k is the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent
income. Assuming that adaptive expectations are a reasonable
18approximation of expectations formation in developing countries,
equation (2.1) can be readily operationalized. Permanent income
is then proxied by a weighted average of present and past current
income.
10' Taking into account a trend factor in income, and using
a Koyck transformation, then yields (see for a full derivation,
Konig, 1978):
(2.3) Ct= k!3Yt + (1 + a -BJC^ + ut
with Ci = consumption in period i
Yt = income in period t
a = trend in income
R = coefficient of expectations adjustment
\it = error term
k can now be identified from the coefficients of C^ and Yt, if
either a is neglected, or if this is estimated directly.
In case of a debt overhang, one would expect k to be higher,
than in the case of normal credit relations. If a country is
constrained on the capital market, one would expect k to be lower
than in the case of free access to the capital market, due to
imperfect smoothing of consumption (see section 2.2).
The problem with the hypotheses on k is, of course, to find the
normal k. If we accept the IMF criterium of rescheduling as a sign
of disrupted capital market relations, the 1970s can be considered
19as a reasonable counterfactual. We will therefore take the change
in marginal propensity to consume outof permanent income between
1971-81 and 1982-87 as an indicator of presence or absence of debt
overhang.
The consumption function was estimated with total per capita
consumption and per capita gross national product, using 1980
prices. This assumes that government consumption is equally valued
as private consumption, but avoids the problem of defining
disposable income for each country
3. Empirical Results
Equations (2.1) and (2.3) were estimated for the period 1971-87
and the two subperiods, 1971-81 and 1982-87 using pooled time
series cross section data for problem debtor countries, in order
to gain the necessary degrees of freedom. For the consumption
function, the Instrumental Variable method was used, since shocks
on income are likely to affect consumption as well. Dummy variables
allowed for different intercepts in both investment and consumption
estimations. The results can thus only be interpreted for an
"average" problem debtor. This precludes detecting presence or
absence of debt incentives for an individual country. The
estimation results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
203.1 The Investment Function
[INSERT TABLE 5]
The estimated investment equations in table 5 perform rather
well in terms of R
2 and F statistics, but this is due to the lagged
investment terms, which were included to suppress autocorrelation
of the residual. Inclusion of a time trend suppressed
heteroscedasticity. This time trend may well capture the effect
of omitted variables equally trended, but candidates for this
(terms of trade, real exchange rates) did not perform well in the
equations, or had inexplicable signs.
The evidence on debt-related variables would reject the debt
overhang hypothesis for the average problem debtor, in the sense
that no negative correlation of debt and investments could be
detected. On the contrary, in the 1982-87 period, both Debt/GDP
and Debt/Exports are significantly positive at the 5 per cent
level. This is in line with the theoretical findings for a
liquidity constraint country. Arrears do not seem to influence
investment behavior in the 1982-87 period, which would occur under
the debt overhang hypothesis. The coefficient for Net Transfers
is significantly positive in both periods, and in each
specification. Estimations were also performed with Net Transfers
21split up on Long Term Debt Service and Long Term Capital
Disbursements, using further the specification of equations (1) and
(3). In 1971-81, the values were respectively (t-values in
parenthesis) -0.39(2.25) and 0.24(2.12). For the 1982-87 period,
the same values were -0.52(3.28) and 0.49(3.66). For both periods,
the null hypothesis that the absolute value of the coefficients was
equal could not be rejected (see appendix II). This implies that
debt service showed no other effects than liquidity effects;
possible negative effects, due to taxation for financing the debt
service, could not be detected in this way.
The second liquidity variable, Savings, is only significantly
positive in the 1980s (equations 3 and 5). A joint test of the
significance of both the Net Transfers and the Savings variable
accepts the null hypothesis of no significant difference from zero
in equation (1), but rejects the same hypothesis for equation (3)
(see appendix II). This would indicate that over the latter
period, the problem debtors have become more constrained in their
access to the international capital market. Tests for structural
change equally indicate different behavior for both sub-periods
(see appendix II), regardless of whether the specification with
Debt/GDP or Debt/Exports is taken.
The negative correlation of interest and investment in the 1982-
87 period is compatible with the credit constraint hypothesis,
given that the problem debtors were net lenders over this period.
22Given the joint insignificance the Net Transfer and Savings
variable over the 1971-1981 period, one might conclude that the
negative correlation of interest and investments indicates
unconstrained capital market access for this period. However, this
is not very plausible, and the interest rate term might capture
part of the neglected substitution effects (see also note 6). The
world market interest rate might be the relevant opportunity costs
of capital for individual agents capable of moving their capital
abroad. The bulk of capital flight took place in the period 1978-
82 (see Gajdeczka, 1990, chart 1), and this might have affected
domestic investments negatively. Including capital flight in the
theoretical analysis seems an interesting extension of this
research.
Although more formal tests for the pooling procedure followed
in the estimations were rejected — or could not be performed, due
to lack of degrees of freedom — the equations estimated for the
whole sample performed quite well for individual countries, as can
be seen in table 6. (For a similar procedure of testing the
pooling procedure, see Pastor, 1989).
[INSERT TABLE 6]
233.2 The Consumption Function
[INSERT TABLE 7]
The marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income, k,
shows a fall in the 1980s as compared to the 1970s. This holds
equally for the marginal propensity to consume corrected for a
trend factor, k .
n^ We conclude therefore that it is more likely
that the marginal propensity to consume was lower in the 1980s
compared to the 1970s, for the problem debtors, than the reverse,
thus contradicting the debt overhang proposition, and the evidence
quoted in IMF (1989). The fall in k is predicted by the credit
constraint hypothesis as presented in section 2.2. The results
from the estimations of table 7 should, however, be interpreted
with precaution. Apart from the specification of the Permanent
Income hypothesis, the estimated coefficients are not very stable
over time, and the observed heteroskedasticity indicates omitted
variables. An F-test for the sub-periods refutes the hypothesis of
no structural change between the 1970's and 1980's. Moreover, the
causes of the movement in k are not analyzed, and might be other
than debt and liquidity variables. Integrating these in the
Permanent Income set-up would be necessary to derive more firmer
conclusions.
12^ This is left for further research.
Although a formal F-test would again reject the method of
24pooling chosen, the correlation of the predicted values from the
estimated equations and the actual values observed for the
individual countries is in general high. Exceptions to this are
Colombia, Brazil and Peru in the period 1971-81.
[INSERT TABLE 8]
4. Conclusions
Whether the drop in problem debtors' investment is due to a debt
overhang rather than to the switch in net transfers, has important
implications for policy. If a debt overhang was to blame for weak
investment, the provision of liquidity alone would leave the
problem of debt-stock-related disincentives unresolved. Debt
reduction would give investment a bigger boost than interest
reduction or new foreign money. On the other hand, countries that
are constrained only by liquidity need infusion of new funds to
take advantage of profitable investment opportunities. Cutting the
debt stock without new lending would not spur investment there.
This paper has developed hypothesis on optimal reactions of a
credit constrained debtor on an increase in debt, variations in
the credit constraint, and changes in interest rates, and
contrasted these with the predictions stemming from the debt
overhang hypothesis. The empirical evidence presented seems to
25reject the debt overhang hypothesis, and is in line with the credit
constraint hypotheses.
The rejection of the debt overhang hypothesis for the average
problem debtor confirms previous alternative empirical attempts to
show the existence of a debt overhang. These have measured the
elasticity of the secondary market price of the debt with respect
to its nominal value (see, notably, Cohen 1989). They have
systematically found a low estimate. While these results cannot
reject the existence of a debt overhang, they imply that debt
relief cannot be Pareto improving (Froot, 1988) except for very few
countries such as Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua and Sudan.
This is bad news for the new international debt strategy which
relies on "voluntary, market-based' debt reduction. For the
available evidence, presented here and elsewhere, implies that the
banks cannot gain (increase the market value of their claims) by
granting debt reduction once they have overcome their own
free-rider problem. Their claims could be better protected by the
provision of new loans.
26NOTES
1. The concept of investment stands here for the broader concept
of "economic reform", like trade liberalization,
privatization, or tax reform. Both investment and "economic
reform" are expected to increase future output and the
capacity to service debt.
2. Another term often used for the countries is "problem
debtors'. They include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, C6te d'lvoire, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria,
Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
3. The sample of non-problem countries could be further extended
according to the selection criteria practiced by the IMF if
some small island economies were added for which, however,
investment and savings data were not readily available.
4. Without loss of generality, Corden's "minimum consumption"
can be set to zero (see Sachs, 1989).
5. Callier (1989) extends Corden's analysis by assuming free
access to this market, but he neglects the effect of credit
rationing on consumption and investment. Free access in
27combination with debt overhang seems a rather odd case.
Corden (1988) devotes some analysis to these substitution
effects. In the case of debt overhang, debt relief would,
due to substitution effects, lead to more investments since
individuals expect lower taxes in the future. He neglects,
however, these substitution effects when discussing the
pro-incentive effect of debt. The substitution effects of
an increase in debt as a fraction of taxes would then lead
to less investment, and will thus counter the pro-incentive
effect.
The analysis is complicated by the possibility of
substitution of investments abroad. Capital flight might be
a rational response to future tax obligation. If no
effective control exists, an increase in debt might only
affect the decision to invest abroad or at home, without
affecting the consumption (or savings) decision. A social
planner could counter these effects by taxing consumption,
equally affecting income from domestic and foreign sources.
Intertemporal substitution effects could be countered by
equalizing tax rates over time, e.g., by supplying investment
credits once an increase in debt occurs. For a discussion
of the effect of debt on capital flight, see for example, Ize
and Ortiz, 1987.
287. An increase in inherited debt can, for example, be caused by
an increase in world interest rates, if the obligations have
variable interest rates. In order not to complicate the
analysis, however, we consider the increase as purely
exogenous.
8. This liquidity effect would be mitigated if creditworthiness
is a function of investments, and if the country could
credibly commit itself to a high level of investments. We
abstract from this possibility here.
9. This consumption point is reached if the receipts from
charging a higher interest rate internally are distributed
in a lump sum matter. In this, the analysis is comparable to
that of a quota on an imported good.
10. This concept of permanent income is valid if current and past
income provide a reasonable indicator for future income
streams. This concept is not undisputed (see for example,
Hall, 1978 and 1989).
11. The trend factor was found by regressing the logarithm of per
capita GNP on time: ln(GNP/CAP) = a + bt + e. The trends,
a, for the debtor groups and the two periods, are then found
by:
a = antilog(b) -1 (See World Bank, 1988).
29The values found for a are;
1971-81 1982-87
0.022 -0.006
It should be noted that the coefficient for time was not
always significant. Furthermore, the value of -0.006 for the
problem debtors is unlikely to be the expected trend. A
higher value for a would imply a lower value for the problem
debtors' trend-corrected marginal propensity to consume over
the 1980s.
16. Adding debt and net transfer variables to the consumption
equation in an ad-hoc manner yields positive signs for both
in the 1971-81 period, with only net transfers significantly
different from 0. In the 1980s, both variables have a
significantly negative sign.
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Ci = Consumption in period i
A = Period 1 output
I = Investments in period 1
f(I)= Output in period 2
D = Inherited debt, to be repaid in period 2
B = Period 1 Borrowing
B_. = Credit constraint
11 la A
r = World interest rate
Assuming a simple, time separable utility function, the Lagrangian
becomes:
(1) Z = U(C!) + 6U(C2)
where u^ are Lagrangian multipliers






(6) B^-BfcO and n3>0 and n3[Bmax-B]=0
and the two definitions for consumption.
Case I: Unconstrained borrowing
If B<Bmax, condition (6) implies that H3=O, and combining (4)and
(5) then gives the usual condition
(7) f,. (1+r)
i.e. investment takes place until marginal returns equal the world
discount rate, and consequently
(8) dl = dr/fn <0
dl/dD equals zero: a change in inherited debt leaves investmentsunaffected.
Case lit Constrained Borrowing
If Bn]ax-B=0/ u3>0, and combining (4) and (5) yields the first order conditions for investment:
(9) f! = (1+r) + H3/(SU2)
In the optimum, marginal productivity of investments is therefore
larger then the world discount rate.
Taking the total differential of (9) yields:
(10) fndl= dr + (dn3/8U2) - (u3dC2/6U22)
Inserting equations (2),(3),(5) and their total differentials into
(10) and rearranging gives:
(11) fndl = (Un/SU^dCj + {(U2(l+r)/U22) - (U22(l+r)/U2) - (U1/8U22)dC2
Realizing that dC^fdB-dl) and dC2=(f jdl-D-fl+rJdB-Bdr), the partial















where r = {(U2(l+r)/U22) - (U22(l+r)/U2) -
For r to be larger then zero, it is sufficient to assume that the
preferences are homothetic (i.e. the functional form of the Utility
function is the same in period 1 and 2) and that the country, if
unconstrained would be a net borrower, implying that 6<l/(l+r),
since then the last term of the definition of r is larger then the
first term in absolute terms, and the whole becomes positive.
Case III: debt and credit constraint interrelated
If the credit constraint depends upon the inherited debt, and if
the credit constraint is binding, dB becomes a function of dD.
Suppose, for simplicity, that under this assumption the credit
constraint becomes:(!2) B<Bmax-D
and therefore dB/dD=-l. Inserting this in equation (11), the




This could be the reason why in bivariate correlations, a negative
relation between debt and investments is found.Appendix II; F-Tests quoted in text
1. Tests for structural changes in the investments equations.
Ho: no structural change
Equations F value accept/reject at 95% level
(1) and (3) F23#188 = 2.04 reject
(2) and (4)
 F23,20i = 1-63 reject
2. Tests for joint significance of the Savings and Net Transfer
variables. Ho: not significantly different from zero






(3) F264 =14.52 reject
3. Test for difference in absolute values of the coefficients of Debt
Service and Long Term Capital disbursements. The unrestricted equation
includes these variables separate; the restricted equations are (1) and
(3) in table 5. Ho: no difference in absolute value.
Sum of Squared Residuals
Unrestricted Restricted Accept/Reiect
Equation Equation F value at 95% level
595.7 (1) F1123 =1.18 accept
157.9 (3) F163 =0.06 accept4. Test for structural change in the Consumption Function.
Ho: no structural change































































Note; Savings Ratios are defined as Gross National Savings as a
percentage of Gross National Product, at current prices.
For the definition of country groups, see text.
Figures in brackets for F-Statistics show the critical
values at the 95 p.c. confidence level.Table 3






























































Note: Investment Ratios are defined as Gross Domestic
Investment as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, at
current prices. For the definition of country groups, see
text. Figures in brackets for F-Statistics show the
critical values at the 95 percent confidence level.Table 4
Expected signs'of coefficients in the investment











































































































































































































































































World Bank, World Tables, 1988-89, Tape Documentation; IMF,
International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1988 (for Yield
on US government bonds and US inflation); Institute of
International Finance (Arrear data); own calculations.
Estimation Method: OSL; fixed effect model. The country
group is defined in section 1.
Fixed investment as a percentage of GDP, lagged one period
Fixed investment as a percentage of GDP, lagged two periods.
Yield on US government bonds corrected for depreciation:
REALRA = RUS - (INFLt) with RUS = Yield on US government
bonds, INFL = percentage change in US GDP-deflator.
Gross Domestic Savings as a percentage of GDP.
Percentage growth in GDP measured as 100 x d log (constant
GDP).
Long term capital disbursements minus long term capital
repayments minus long term interest payments as a percentage
of GDP.
Public and private long term external debt minus
international reserves as a percentage of GDP.
Public and Private long term external debt minus
international reserves as a percentage of Exports and
Non-Factor Services.
Time variable, with 1968 =1 1987 = 20.
Interest arrears outstanding as a percentage of total debt
service due.
Estimated first order correlation of the residuals.
Breusch Pagan Test statistic for heteroscedasticity.
All variables, except the investment terms, are averages of
period t and (t-1).









































































Note: Equations refer to the estimations reported in table 5Table 7


























































Source:World Bank, World Tables, 1988-89, Tape Documentation;
World Bank, World Development Report, 1989; own
calculations.
Note: Estimation Methodinstrumental variables, fixed effect
model. Instruments: Lagged Consumption, lagged income and
country intercept dummies. The constant term, in all but
one case insignificant, is not reported. The variables
used in the regressions were expressed in local currency
per capita, using 1980 prices.
Consumption is private plus government consumption. Lagged
Consumption is private plus government consumption lagged
one period; Income is Gross National Product,
k is the marginal propensity to consume from permanent
income (see text); kg is the marginal propensity to consume
from permanent, corrected for a trend factor. 4> denotes
estimates first order auto correlation. B is the Breusch
Pagan test statistic for heteroscedasticity. Population was
calculated using 1968 data, and extrapolated using
population growth rates from the World Development Report,
1989. (Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses).Table 8
Correlation Coefficients between actual and predicted








































































Jo J, A Output,Consumption,
Investment period 1.Output and
Consumption
Period 2.
Fig. 2
C
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Output, Consumption,
Investment period 1.
DFig. 3
Output and
Consumption
Period 2.
HcOutput, Consumption,
Investment period 1.